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C.N. OTTOSEN, Commissioner
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OF UTAH, by and through its
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REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I - PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE INSURANCE CODE.
A.

Mr. Mills1 Acts Related to the Law.

Plaintiff in his

Answering Brief claims difficulty in relating the facts of this
case to a violation of the Insurance Code.

Defendant is happy

to clarify the violation by relating Mr. Mills1 acts to the
law.
1.

The "performance bond" executed by Mr. Mills is a

contract of insurance as defined by 31-1-7, because it is a
"contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or to
pay an amount upon determinable risk contingencies,"
2.

Signing and delivering the bond to Mr, Bradshaw

was a "transaction of insurance" as defined by 31-1-11 because
it was "execution of an insurance contract."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23.

Mr* Mills caused his agency to become an insurer

as defined in 31-1-10 because it became "engaged as surety."
4.

Mr. Mills" agency did not have a certificate of

authority to transact insurance business.
5.

Mr. Mills caused his agency to violate the pro-

visions of 31-5-2 because "no insurer shall transact any
insurance in this state except that authorized by a valid
and existing certificate of authority issued to it by the
Commissioner."
6.

Mr. Mills "knowingly participated in the violation

of a provision of the Insurance Code" contrary to 31-17-50(b)
by causing his agency to act as an insurer without a certificate of authority.
1.

Mr. Mills, "in the conduct of his affairs under

his license," in causing his agency to act as an insurer
without a certificate of authority, "showed himself to be
and was deemed by the Commissioner to be untrustworthy"
contrary to the provisions of 31-17-50 (h)•
8.

Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an insurer

without a certificate of authority "exercised powers relative
to insurance outside the scope of his licensing" contrary
to the provisions of 31-17-50 (i).
9.

Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an

insurer without a certificate of authority did not "act in
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~3good faith, abstain from deception and practice honesty,"
nor did he "preserve inviolate the integrity of insurance"
as required by 31-1-8.
B.

Mr. Mills' Agency was an "insurer."

Plaintifffs answering argument in Point I is largely
devoted to maintaining that Mr. Mills did not cause his agency
to act as an insurer because although the performance bond
was "insurance" and the execution of the bond was an "insurance
transaction" the agency was not an "insurer" so as to require
a certificate of authority.

This so claims Plaintiff, because

this transaction of insurance was an isolated one for which
no premium was charged.
A discussion of the definition of "insurer" will be
helpful.

We believe the definition as set out in 31-1-10

reads as if phrased as follows:
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as:
1*

Indemnitor,

2.

Surety, or

3.

Contractor in the business of entering into contracts

of insurance or annuity.
We believe the phrase "in the business of entering into
contracts of insurance or annuity" modifies only contractor
and not either surety or indemnitor.

We believe this phrase

was used primarily to eliminate from the definition of
insurer "the insured" who is also a "contractor."
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Both

-4"indemnitor" and "surety" by definition include entering into
contracts of insurance.

If the phrase were construed to

modify both indemnitor and surety as well, this section would
be read as,
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as indemnitor in
the business of entering into contracts of insurance."
which is not only redundant and circular, but not sensible.
Although we believe the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the wording is clear it should also be noted
that the rules of legislative construction require such a
result.

Under the doctrine of the so-called "last antecedent,"

phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately
preceeding and are not to be construed as extending to others
more remote.

2 CJS "Statutes" §334 and U.S. - Buscaglis v

Bowie, C C A . Puerto Rico, 139 F.2d 294 - Corpus Juris cited
in U.S. ex rel Santarelli v Hughes, C C A . N.J. 116, F2d,
613,616? Utah - Corpus Juris cited in State v Navaro, 26 P.2d
955, 959, 83 Utah 6 - Dunn v Bryan, 200 P.253, 77 Utah 604.
It should also be noted there is no comma separating "contractor" from "in the business of entering into contracts of
insurance or annuity."

This type punctuation as a general

rule is construed to mean the clause modifies only the last
antecedent and not all the preceding clauses.

82 CJS "Statutes"

§334 and S.D. Lewis v Annie Creek Mining Co., 48 N.W. 2d 815.
Finally, we think the results which would flow from
Plaintiff's interpretation would be contrary to the whole idea
of regulating
insurance.
itsBYU.
nature, provides
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~5for a small payment to be made to buy the protection.

If

the protected-against event occurs, usually a disproportionately large sum must be paid the insured.

Much

of insurance regulation centers around making sure that this
large sum can be paid as promised.

For instance, the code

requires that if an insurer obtains a certificate of authority to write suretyship insurance he must have $300,000 in
capital and $500,000 in surplus - $800,000 over and above the
liabilities of the insurer.

In spite of this, Plaintiff

contends that if an insurer is only at it part-time or sporadically so as not to be efficient and does not make money
so as to be successful, he can write surety insurance without
regulation by the Department.

The legislature did not

intend such a result.
POINT II - THE VIOLATION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO DEMAND
LICENSE REVOCATION.
A.

The Circumstances of this Violation.

Plaintiff in his brief would have the Court believe that
the Plaintiff reluctantly and innocently succumbed to the
pressures of Mr. Bradshaw and signed the bond with the idea
that the bank would look at it and if they liked the surety
they could accept it and if they thought the surety was not
adequate, they could reject it.

The Insurance Commissioner

views the circumstances otherwise.

Plaintiff's actions in

signing a licensed insurer blank bond form and handing it to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6Mr. Bradshaw together with a Mills-Gundry card to make the
necessary changes and completions is a sorry story.

It tells

clearer than confession that Mr. Mills was aware he was doing
a wrong.

It also says something about Mr.. Mills.

He was

willing to implicate Mr. Bradshaw in a wrong instead of
independently assuming the responsibility of an insurance
transaction himself as a licensed insurance agent knowledge
able in the field*

These circumstances do not exculpate Mr.

Mills but damn him.
B.

The Violation is ESerious.

Let us look at the exposure of the bank.

Assume the bank

had accepted the performance bond as tendered them.

Assume

they then loaned the $1,000,000 for construction of the building with the building forming a substantial part of the security for the loan.

Assume the contractor did not build the

building in accordance with the plans and specifications but
shortcut the foundation by using less steel than required
and less cement in the concrete than required so the building
when completed was unacceptable and had to be razed.

The

bank would be out the $1,000,000 but would not have the
contemplated building as security.

These circumstances are

remote of happening, but are the very kinds of circumstances
against which the bank was trying to safeguard itself in
requiring the performance bond.

When Mr. Mills caused to be

placed in the stream of commerce the bond which had all of
the appearances of being executed by an insurer qualified
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~7under the State Code to write such insurance and executed
by an insurer regulated by the Insurance Department so as
to minimize the risks of loss for an insured, Mr. Mills
at that moment exposed the bank to these dangers.

The bank

was not damaged, but this was due to the bank's own
carefulness, not to Mr. Mills1 probity.

The integrity of

the insurance industry requires that an insurance agent
minimize this kind of risk, not contribute to this kind of
exposure.
For this reason, the Commissioner felt strongly enough
to revoke Mr. Mills8 license.

He feels strongly enough that

Mr. Mills1 license should be revoked to perfect this appeal
and urge this Court to overrule the Trial Courtfs judgment
and allow him to regulate insurance within this state in
accordance with the duty imposed upon him by the law.
Dated this 6th day of December, 197 6.
Respectfully submitted,

^W^|/^
William G^jGi^bs
Special Assistant Attorney
General
350 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for DefendantAppellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

